Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
ProxyLogon is the pre-authentication exploit chain against on-premises Microsoft Exchange, disclosed in March 2021, that led to the mass compromise of tens of thousands of mail servers.

What Is ProxyLogon?
ProxyLogon is the name given to an exploit chain against on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server, built from CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27065. Together they allowed an unauthenticated attacker who could reach port 443 to execute code on the server as SYSTEM. Microsoft released out-of-band patches on 2 March 2021, and within days it became one of the largest mass exploitation events on record.
CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery in the Exchange Client Access Service. By manipulating the backend cookie in a request to the frontend, an attacker could cause Exchange to issue an internal request on their behalf, authenticated as the server itself. That gave access to the Exchange backend without any credentials—the “logon” the name refers to.
CVE-2021-27065 is a post-authentication arbitrary file write in the Offline Address Book configuration. Having reached the backend through the first flaw, the attacker set an OAB virtual directory property to a crafted value and wrote a file of their choosing to a path of their choosing, typically an ASPX web shell in the Exchange web root.
Two further issues were patched at the same time: CVE-2021-26857, an insecure deserialisation flaw in the Unified Messaging service, and CVE-2021-26858, another file write. Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 were affected. Exchange Online was not, which is the detail that pushed many organisations off on-premises mail for good.
Orange Tsai of DEVCORE reported the SSRF to Microsoft on 5 January 2021, having found it while researching the Exchange frontend architecture. Microsoft began investigating and scheduled a fix for the March patch cycle.
In late February, exploitation activity increased sharply across multiple unrelated groups, suggesting the vulnerability details had leaked. Microsoft brought the patches forward to 2 March and published them out of band, naming a group it tracked as Hafnium as the original exploiter and attributing it to a state-sponsored Chinese operation.
The patch release triggered a race. Within 48 hours, mass scanning was under way, and at least ten distinct groups were deploying web shells—some for espionage, some for cryptomining, and by the middle of March the DearCry and Black Kingdom ransomware families. Estimates put the number of compromised servers at between 60,000 and a quarter of a million worldwide, including a large population of small businesses, charities, schools, and local authorities running Exchange because it came with their infrastructure rather than because anyone was managing it.
The response was extraordinary in one respect: in April 2021 the FBI obtained a court order authorising it to remotely delete web shells from compromised US servers without notifying the owners first, on the grounds that too many would never be cleaned up otherwise.
The web shells persisted independently of the vulnerability. An organisation that applied the March updates promptly but had been compromised the previous week still had an attacker with full access to every mailbox on the server. Microsoft published a dedicated health checker script and nmap scripts specifically to find the artefacts, because the patch status told you nothing about whether you had been hit.
This distinction—between closing the hole and removing the intruder—is the single most important lesson from ProxyLogon, and it applies equally to every edge device vulnerability since.
cmd.exe or powershell.exe.At Privia Security, our Investigation and Incident Response Services include compromise assessment for mail infrastructure, which is still where we find the oldest unremediated web shells.
No. The chain targets on-premises Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019. Exchange Online was never vulnerable, because the affected frontend and backend architecture differs and Microsoft patches its own service. Hybrid deployments are affected, however, since they require an on-premises Exchange server, and that server is just as exposed as a fully on-premises one.
Look for ASPX files in the Exchange web directories with creation dates in the exposure window, entries in the ECP server logs showing OAB virtual directory changes, and IIS log entries containing the backend cookie manipulation pattern. Microsoft published a health checker script and detection guidance for exactly this. If logs no longer reach back that far, treat the server as having unknown status.
Both are Exchange exploit chains found by the same researcher, but they use different flaws. ProxyLogon, disclosed in March 2021, chains an SSRF with a file write. ProxyShell, exploited from August 2021, uses a path confusion issue in the Autodiscover service with a privilege escalation and a mailbox export. ProxyShell was patched earlier in the year but exploited after the technical details were presented publicly.
It can be, but it demands real operational discipline: current cumulative updates so security patches will install, administrative endpoints restricted to internal networks, tier-zero treatment in your Active Directory model, and active monitoring of the web root. Organisations without the capacity for that should seriously evaluate moving mail to a hosted service, since the attack surface has proven consistently attractive.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.