Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
An NTLM relay attack forwards a victim’s authentication to a third system in real time, letting the attacker act as that user without ever learning or cracking their password.

What Is an NTLM Relay Attack?
An NTLM relay attack takes the authentication a Windows host is performing and forwards it, live, to a different service. The attacker never learns the password and never cracks a hash. They simply sit in the middle of a challenge-response exchange, passing messages between the victim and the target, and when the handshake completes they hold an authenticated session as that user. Twenty years after it was first demonstrated, it is still one of the most productive techniques in internal network testing.
NTLM authentication is a three-message exchange: the client announces itself, the server returns a challenge, and the client proves it knows the password by encrypting that challenge. Nothing in the protocol binds the exchange to the connection it travels over.
So the attacker runs a rogue server. A victim connects—because it was coerced, or poisoned into doing so, or simply because a scheduled job points at the wrong hostname. The attacker opens a connection to the real target, takes the challenge it issues, hands it back to the victim as if it were their own, collects the victim’s response, and presents it to the target. The target validates the response against the domain controller, which confirms it is genuine, and grants the session to the attacker.
Reflecting authentication back at the same machine was fixed by MS08-068 in 2008. Relaying it to a different machine was not, and cannot be in the general case without the signing and binding controls below.
Relay needs traffic. The two reliable sources are:
The relay target determines the outcome, and this is where the real damage is decided.
Impacket’s ntlmrelayx.py implements all of these, which is why it and Responder are the first two tools on most internal engagements.
Relay is not patched away; it is configured away. The controls are specific and each closes one path:
A relayed authentication looks legitimate at the target, so detection works best at the edges. Watch for authentication events where the source workstation name does not match the source IP address, machine accounts authenticating to hosts they have no reason to reach, certificate requests from unexpected requesters in the AD CS logs, and sudden changes to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity or msDS-KeyCredentialLink on computer objects. Directory object change auditing, event 5136, is the one to enable.
Our Penetration Test Services include an Active Directory relay assessment that reports which of these five controls is missing and what each gap is worth to an attacker.
Pass-the-hash reuses a stolen NT hash that the attacker already possesses, so it works offline and at any time. NTLM relay never obtains the hash at all. It forwards a live authentication exchange to a third system within the few seconds that the challenge remains valid, which means the attack must happen while the victim is connecting, but it requires no prior credential theft.
Only the SMB path. Signing adds a cryptographic integrity check tied to the session, so a relayed SMB authentication fails. It has no effect on relay to LDAP, to AD CS web enrolment over HTTP, or to other HTTP services. Each protocol needs its own protection: LDAP signing and channel binding, and Extended Protection for Authentication on IIS-hosted endpoints.
Kerberos is far more resistant because tickets are bound to a specific service principal name, so a ticket for one service cannot be replayed against another. Research has shown Kerberos relay is possible in narrow circumstances involving name resolution control, but in practice moving services to Kerberos-only authentication removes the overwhelming majority of relay risk.
Begin with the highest-value path: protect Active Directory Certificate Services web enrolment, or remove it if unused, because relay to AD CS leads directly to domain compromise. Then enforce SMB signing estate-wide, enable LDAP signing and channel binding, and finally disable LLMNR and NetBIOS name service to cut off the opportunistic traffic that feeds the attack.
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