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What Are Turkey’s Notable Data Breach Decisions?

Decisions of the Turkish data protection board show a consistent pattern: 72-hour notification, published breach announcements, and fines for weak technical measures and late reporting.

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Home / Blog / Cybersecurity Terms / What Are Turkey’s Notable Data Breach Decisions?
17 November 2026

What Are Turkey’s Notable Data Breach Decisions?

What Are Turkey’s Notable Data Breach Decisions?

Turkey’s data protection board has been publishing breach decisions since 2019, and the body of cases now gives a clear picture of what the regulator expects. For UK groups with Turkish subsidiaries or suppliers, the decisions are more useful than the statute, because they show where the line actually falls.

Two features distinguish the Turkish regime from the UK one immediately. Breach notifications are published on the authority’s website, naming the organisation and summarising the incident, often within days. And the notification clock is fixed by a board decision rather than left to interpretation.

The 72-Hour Rule and Its Origin

Law No. 6698 requires data controllers to report breaches “in the shortest time”, which on its own meant little. Board Decision 2019/10, taken on 24 January 2019, turned that into a working rule: notify the Authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach, using the Authority’s breach notification form, and inform affected individuals directly and in the shortest reasonable time afterwards.

The decision also closed a loophole organisations had used. Announcing a breach through a press release or a notice on a website does not discharge the duty to the individuals concerned where their contact details are known; direct notification is expected. Several later fines rest on exactly that failure.

Cases Worth Knowing

Recurring findings across decisions include storing passwords without adequate hashing, excessive retention of data that should have been deleted, insufficient logging to establish what an attacker accessed, standing administrative access without justification, and the absence of a local representative for controllers based abroad.

Comparing the Two Regimes

TurkeyUnited Kingdom
Notification deadline72 hours, set by board decision72 hours under UK GDPR Article 33
Public disclosure by the regulatorBreach summaries published routinely, naming the controllerNot published as standard; enforcement actions are published
Maximum fineBands under Article 18, revalued annually, in the millions of lira£17.5 million or 4% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher
Registry obligationVERBIS entry, publicAnnual fee to the ICO; processing records held internally
Representative for foreign controllersMandatory, must be localRequired under Article 27, with exemptions

UK enforcement for comparison: British Airways was fined £20 million and Marriott £18.4 million in October 2020, Interserve £4.4 million in 2022, TikTok £12.7 million in 2023, and Advanced Computer Software £3.07 million in 2025 following a ransomware incident affecting NHS services. The Turkish fines are an order of magnitude smaller in money terms, but the public naming of every breach carries a reputational cost that UK organisations rarely face.

What Changed in 2024

Amendments to the Turkish law in March 2024 reshaped international transfers, replacing a system that had relied heavily on explicit consent with a structure closer to the European one: adequacy decisions, standard contracts, and binding corporate rules, with standard contracts notified to the Authority shortly after signature. Processing conditions for special category data were also revised. Groups that built transfer arrangements before 2024 should revisit them, because the old consent-based approach is no longer the expected route.

Practical Lessons for Group Security Teams

Three things follow for a UK parent. Make sure the Turkish entity can actually detect a breach within hours, since the 72-hour clock starts at awareness and weak logging extends neither the deadline nor the regulator’s patience. Prepare the notification route in advance as a branch of your incident response plan, in Turkish, with named signatories. And assume publication: a Turkish breach becomes public knowledge quickly, so group communications planning should start from that assumption rather than from the UK norm of quiet regulatory engagement.

If you need breach readiness tested across both jurisdictions, our investigation and incident response services rehearse detection, decision-making, and notification together.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

How Quickly Must a Breach Be Reported in Turkey?

Within 72 hours of the data controller becoming aware of it, under Board Decision 2019/10 of 24 January 2019, using the Authority’s notification form. Affected individuals must also be informed directly and promptly where their contact details are known. A website notice or press release does not replace direct notification, and several fines have rested on that point.

Does the Turkish Authority Publish Breach Notifications?

Yes. Summaries of reported breaches are published on the Authority’s website, typically naming the controller and describing the categories of data and people affected. This differs markedly from the UK, where the ICO does not routinely publish individual breach reports and only enforcement outcomes become public, often more than a year after the incident.

Are Turkish Fines Comparable to UK GDPR Penalties?

No. Turkish administrative fines are set in bands under Article 18 and revalued annually, reaching into the millions of lira, which is far below the UK GDPR maximum of £17.5 million or 4% of global annual turnover. The Marriott case is the clearest comparison: the same underlying incident produced an £18.4 million ICO fine and a 1,450,000 lira Turkish fine.

What Do the Decisions Say About Technical Measures?

They consistently penalise basic failures: passwords stored without adequate protection, logs too limited to determine what an attacker accessed, data retained long after its purpose ended, and standing privileged access. The board expects measures proportionate to the sensitivity and volume of data, and it treats a long detection time as evidence that monitoring was inadequate rather than as bad luck.

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