Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
SS7 attacks abuse the legacy telephone signalling network, which has no authentication between operators, to locate subscribers, intercept calls and texts, and commit fraud.

What Are SS7 Attacks?
Signalling System No. 7 is the control language of the telephone network. Designed in the 1970s for a world of a few dozen state-owned carriers connected by dedicated links, it carries the messages that set up calls, deliver text messages, and keep track of where a subscriber is. It has no authentication. A network receiving an SS7 message has historically had no way to verify that the sender is who it claims to be, or that it has any legitimate reason to ask.
That was tolerable when the membership of the network was a closed list. It stopped being tolerable when the list grew to thousands of operators, virtual operators, and interconnect providers, any one of which can be compromised, bought, or leased by someone with other intentions.
The vulnerabilities were presented publicly at the Chaos Communication Congress in December 2014 by Tobias Engel and, separately, by Karsten Nohl, whose team demonstrated location tracking and call interception against ordinary handsets. In 2016 a CBS 60 Minutes segment showed the same technique used against a serving United States congressman’s phone with his consent.
The case that ended the argument came in 2017, when customers of the German operator O2-Telefonica had their bank accounts emptied. The attackers had already stolen banking credentials through malware; they then used SS7 access to intercept the one-time codes sent by text to authorise the transfers. It was the first widely reported instance of signalling interception being used at scale for straightforward financial theft, and it is the reason regulators and standards bodies began moving away from text messages as an authentication factor.
SS7 is still in service because the network is layered rather than replaced. 4G introduced Diameter, which has its own weaknesses and similar trust assumptions, and 5G introduced a service-based architecture with authenticated interconnect, but legacy roaming, legacy handsets, and legacy interconnect agreements keep SS7 reachable. An attacker only needs one path, and the global network provides many.
Access is also obtainable. Signalling connectivity is a commercial product, sold legitimately to operators, aggregators, and messaging providers, and it has been resold, leased, and misused. Several commercial surveillance firms have been documented using signalling access for location tracking services sold to government clients.
For organisations rather than operators, the defence is simpler and more decisive: stop relying on the telephone network for security. Move authentication to app-based approval, passkeys, or hardware keys, as discussed under multi-factor authentication, and use end-to-end encrypted messaging for sensitive conversations. These measures also neutralise number porting fraud and IMSI catchers, which attack the same dependency from different directions.
UK operators are subject to the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022, with a code of practice that addresses signalling protection and the treatment of other networks as untrusted. Ofcom enforces and the NCSC advises. The NCSC has also advised for several years that text messages are the weakest commonly available second factor and that organisations should move to stronger methods where they can, which is consistent with the direction taken by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the United States.
Our network security services assess signalling boundaries and interconnect filtering for operators, and authentication dependencies for enterprises that have not yet moved away from text-based codes.
No, it requires access to the signalling network, which is a commercial product sold to operators, interconnect providers, and messaging aggregators. The barrier is commercial and legal rather than technical: an attacker needs to obtain, lease, or compromise legitimate access. That has happened often enough, through small operators and resellers, that the barrier should not be relied upon as a control.
Only for subscribers and networks operating entirely on standalone 5G with authenticated interconnect, which is a small proportion of global traffic today. Legacy roaming, older handsets, and existing interconnect agreements keep SS7 reachable, and an attacker needs only one viable path. Expect signalling firewalls and filtering to remain necessary for many years.
Where a stronger option exists, yes. Text codes are vulnerable to signalling interception, number porting fraud, and malware reading notifications, and the German banking case showed the combination being used for direct theft. Where no alternative is offered, keep it, because it is still far better than a password alone, and prioritise migration for email, banking, and administrative accounts.
Through firewalls that categorise incoming messages by whether they could legitimately arrive from an external network, combined with monitoring for implausible patterns: location updates inconsistent with physical travel, repeated interrogation of subscriber records from one source, and queries for subscribers with no roaming relationship to that network. Mature operators treat these as security alerts rather than as signalling errors.
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