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Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
NotPetya arrived through a Ukrainian accounting software update on 27 June 2017, spread in minutes using stolen credentials, and destroyed data it pretended to hold to ransom.

How the NotPetya Attack Worked
On the afternoon of 27 June 2017, machines across Ukraine began rebooting into what looked like a disk check, then displayed a ransom note demanding 300 US dollars in Bitcoin. Within hours the same screen appeared in Copenhagen, New Jersey, Mumbai, and Rotterdam. The malware, named NotPetya because it borrowed the appearance of the earlier Petya ransomware, is still the costliest cyberattack on record, with damage estimated at around 10 billion US dollars.
It was not ransomware. The installation key shown to victims was randomly generated and never transmitted anywhere, so no payment could ever produce a decryption key. The encryption was a destruction mechanism wearing a disguise.
NotPetya was delivered through the update mechanism of M.E.Doc, a tax accounting package used by the large majority of companies filing in Ukraine. Attackers had compromised the vendor’s update server months earlier and pushed a backdoored release to customers, who installed it exactly as they were supposed to.
That choice of vector determined the victim set. Any multinational with a Ukrainian subsidiary, a Ukrainian supplier, or a single office that filed Ukrainian tax returns received the malware on a trusted internal system. Maersk’s global outage reportedly began with one finance workstation in Odesa.
Three propagation methods ran in parallel, which is the detail that matters for defenders:
The third method is why patching alone did not save anyone. A fully patched workstation would still be infected by an administrator credential stolen from an unpatched one three hops away. Organisations that used a single domain administrator account across the estate lost the estate. Propagation across a flat global network took well under an hour, far faster than any human response.
NotPetya encrypted files with common extensions, then wrote a modified bootloader over the master boot record and encrypted the Master File Table on reboot, rendering the volume unreadable. It also contained a wiper path that overwrote the first sectors outright on systems where its other routines failed. Recovery from an infected host was not possible; every machine had to be rebuilt.
In February 2018, the UK Foreign Office and the NCSC publicly attributed NotPetya to the Russian military, a judgement supported by the United States, Australia, Canada, and others. In October 2020, the US indicted six officers of GRU Unit 74455, the group tracked as Sandworm.
That attribution triggered the most consequential insurance litigation in cyber history. Insurers declined claims under war exclusion clauses written for conventional conflict. Mondelez and Zurich settled in 2022; Merck won a New Jersey appellate ruling that the exclusion did not apply, and the case settled in January 2024. The practical outcome is that modern cyber policies contain rewritten state-backed attack exclusions, and any UK organisation buying cover should read them specifically rather than assuming a destructive incident is covered.
NotPetya established destructive, non-financially motivated malware as a planning assumption, and it made three controls non-negotiable: unique local administrator passwords enforced by LAPS or an equivalent, network segmentation that prevents workstation-to-workstation SMB, and offline or immutable backups that a domain administrator credential cannot reach. It is also the clearest argument for treating supplier software updates as an attack path, the same lesson SolarWinds taught three years later.
Testing whether such a spread is still possible in your estate is a standard objective in our Red Team Services.
A wiper presented as ransomware. The installation identifier shown on the ransom screen was random data rather than an encoded key, and no mechanism existed to return a decryption key to a victim who paid. The ransom note served to delay attribution and to make the incident look like ordinary crime, while the actual effect was the permanent destruction of data.
Not on its own. The EternalBlue exploit was only one of three propagation routes. NotPetya also stole credentials from memory and used PsExec and WMIC to move to fully patched machines with legitimate administrative rights. Organisations that reused a single administrator password across the estate were compromised regardless of patch status, which is why credential hygiene mattered as much as patching.
By rebuilding rather than restoring. Every domain controller had been encrypted, meaning the Active Directory database was gone, until a controller in Ghana was found to have been offline during a local power cut. That single surviving copy allowed the directory to be reconstructed, and the company rebuilt roughly 4,000 servers and 45,000 computers over about ten days.
It depends entirely on the wording, and the NotPetya litigation is the reason. Insurers initially refused claims under war exclusions, with mixed results in court and settlements in the major cases. Policies written since have far more specific state-backed cyber operation exclusions, so buyers should read those clauses closely and understand what level of government attribution would trigger them.
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