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What Is LSASS Memory Dumping?

LSASS memory dumping extracts the credentials Windows keeps in the Local Security Authority process, handing an attacker password hashes and Kerberos tickets for every logged-on account.

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17 November 2026

What Is LSASS Memory Dumping?

What Is LSASS Memory Dumping?

The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, lsass.exe, is the Windows process responsible for authentication. To spare users from retyping their password for every network resource, it keeps credential material in memory for each active logon session: NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets and session keys, certificates, and—on older or badly configured systems—plaintext passwords. Reading that memory is one of the most valuable things an attacker can do on a compromised Windows host, and it is catalogued in MITRE ATT&CK as T1003.001.

Why It Pays Off So Well

A workstation is rarely interesting in itself. What makes it valuable is who has logged on to it. A help desk engineer who connected last Tuesday to fix a printer leaves their credentials in that machine’s LSASS memory. If that account is a member of a privileged group, dumping LSASS converts a routine endpoint compromise into domain-wide access, usually via pass-the-hash or pass-the-ticket, with no password cracking required.

This is the reason tiered administration exists. It is also why credential dumping appears in almost every ransomware intrusion report: the technique is the bridge between initial access and the privileges needed to reach backups and hypervisors.

How Attackers Do It

All of these require local administrator or SYSTEM rights first.

Stopping It

Several controls stack usefully, and none is sufficient alone.

Credential Guard is the strongest. It uses virtualisation-based security to move secrets into an isolated process that the normal kernel cannot read, so a dump of LSASS yields encrypted blobs rather than usable hashes. It is enabled by default on Windows 11 Enterprise 22H2 and later for clean installs, but frequently absent on upgraded estates and on servers.

LSA Protection, set through the RunAsPPL registry value, runs LSASS as a protected process so that unprotected code cannot open a handle to it. It is bypassable by an attacker willing to load a vulnerable driver, but it eliminates the easy methods.

The attack surface reduction rule “Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem service” in Microsoft Defender blocks the common handle requests and is quick to deploy in audit mode first.

Configuration hygiene matters too: disable WDigest so plaintext passwords are not cached, add administrators to the Protected Users group, and apply the principle of least privilege so that privileged accounts never log on to ordinary workstations in the first place.

Detecting the Attempt

Detection focuses on who opens a handle to LSASS and with what access rights:

Expect legitimate noise from antivirus products, backup agents, and monitoring tools, so baseline the normal set of processes that touch LSASS in your environment before alerting. Tuning that baseline is routine work for a security operations centre, and it is work our SOC Maturation Services do alongside your own team.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Does LSASS Still Store Plaintext Passwords?

Not by default on supported Windows versions. WDigest authentication, which cached plaintext credentials, has been disabled since Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, though an attacker with administrator rights can re-enable it through the registry and wait for the next logon. Even without plaintext, the NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets held in LSASS are directly reusable, so the process remains a high-value target.

Is LSA Protection Enough on Its Own?

It raises the bar but can be defeated. RunAsPPL stops unprotected user-mode code from opening a handle to LSASS, which blocks the common tools. An attacker who loads a vulnerable signed driver can strip the protection flag from kernel space, a technique seen regularly in ransomware intrusions. Pair LSA Protection with Credential Guard, driver blocklisting, and detection on driver loads.

Can We Detect Dumping If the Attacker Uses a Signed Microsoft Tool?

Yes, because the detection focuses on behaviour rather than the binary. Whatever tool is used must open a handle to lsass.exe with read access to its memory, which produces a Sysmon Event ID 10 or an object access audit event. Watching for that handle request, combined with alerting on dump file creation, catches ProcDump, Task Manager, and comsvcs.dll equally.

What Should We Do After Confirming an LSASS Dump?

Treat every credential that had an active session on that host as compromised. Reset the passwords of those accounts, revoke Kerberos tickets by resetting the affected computer account, and if any privileged account was present, plan a wider recovery including the KRBTGT reset. Then investigate how administrator rights were obtained on the host, because the dump is a symptom rather than the root cause.

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