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What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later?

Harvest now, decrypt later describes an adversary recording encrypted traffic today in order to decrypt it once quantum computers can break the key exchange that protected it.

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17 November 2026

What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later?

What Is Harvest Now, Decrypt Later?

Most cryptographic risk is about what an attacker can do now. This one is about what they can do later. An adversary with storage and patience captures encrypted traffic today — VPN sessions, TLS connections, database replication, backup transfers — and keeps it until a cryptographically relevant quantum computer can break the key exchange that protected it. The session was secure when it happened and is readable afterwards.

The phrase is also written as store now, decrypt later, and it is the reason post-quantum migration is treated as urgent rather than as a problem for the 2030s. Data encrypted today with X25519 or RSA is already exposed if it must stay confidential beyond the arrival of that machine.

Why Recording Is Cheap and Breaking Is Deferred

Capturing traffic requires a vantage point and disk space, both of which a state-level actor has in abundance, and neither of which leaves much trace. Decryption is deferred to a future in which Shor’s algorithm, running on a large fault-tolerant quantum computer, solves the integer factorisation and discrete logarithm problems that RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves depend on.

Symmetric cryptography is far less affected. Grover’s algorithm offers a square-root speed-up against a brute-force search, so AES-256 keeps a comfortable margin and AES-128 becomes merely adequate. The exposure is concentrated in the key exchange, which is precisely what a recorded handshake contains.

Mosca’s Inequality

Michele Mosca framed the deadline as a simple comparison. If x is how long your data must stay confidential, y is how long migration will take your organisation, and z is how long until a quantum computer can break your algorithms, then you have a problem whenever x + y > z.

The value of z is genuinely unknown; expert surveys place meaningful probability on the 2030s. What organisations control is x and y. A bank holding mortgage records for decades and needing four years to migrate is already past the line on any plausible estimate. A retailer whose session data is worthless in a fortnight is not.

Which Data Is Actually at Risk

DataConfidentiality lifetimePriority
Health records, genetic dataLifetime of the individualHighest
Government, defence, diplomatic materialDecades, often statutoryHighest
Intellectual property, research, source codeYears to decadesHigh
Legal and financial records, long-term contracts7 years and beyondHigh
Identity documents and long-lived credentialsUntil reissuedMedium to high
Session cookies, short-lived API trafficHoursLow

Note that signatures are a different case. A signature verified today cannot be forged retrospectively by a future quantum computer, so signing algorithms face a deadline driven by the lifetime of the trust anchor rather than by recorded traffic. Confidentiality is the urgent half.

What to Do Before the Full Migration

  1. Deploy hybrid key exchange where it is available. Combining X25519 with ML-KEM means an attacker must break both, and a recorded session resists a quantum adversary. Chrome, Firefox, Cloudflare, and the major cloud providers rolled this out during 2024 and 2025, and hybrid key exchange is now a configuration decision rather than a research project.
  2. Identify the long-lived confidential flows. Replication links, backup transfers, site-to-site VPNs, and bulk file transfers between data centres carry years of data over a handful of connections, and are both high value and easy to upgrade.
  3. Raise symmetric strength. Move to AES-256 where the choice exists, since it costs almost nothing and removes symmetric algorithms from the conversation.
  4. Build the cryptographic inventory. You cannot prioritise what you have not mapped; this is the discovery phase in NCSC and NIST guidance and the slowest part of the work.
  5. Ask suppliers now. Much of your cryptography is in products you did not write. Procurement language and vendor roadmaps are the lever, and they take time to apply.

How the UK Frames the Timetable

NCSC guidance published in 2025 sets out three milestones for UK organisations: identify and plan by 2028, complete the highest-priority migrations by 2031, and finish by 2035. NIST standardised ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA in August 2024, giving the algorithms to migrate to, and has signalled that RSA and elliptic curve cryptography should be deprecated around 2030 and disallowed by 2035.

Treating harvest now, decrypt later as speculative misreads the cost structure. The recording is happening whether or not the decryption ever becomes possible, and the mitigation for new sessions is already deployable. Where the data you move today still matters in ten years, migration planning belongs on this year’s roadmap, and we help organisations scope that work within our cyber risk analysis services.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Is Anyone Actually Recording Encrypted Traffic?

Bulk collection of internet traffic by state agencies is well documented, and storage is cheap enough that targeted recording is within reach of many actors. No one can confirm which specific flows are being kept. The sensible planning assumption is that high-value traffic crossing untrusted networks may be retained, and to act accordingly for data with a long confidentiality life.

Does This Affect Data at Rest as Well as in Transit?

Mostly in transit, because that is what an outsider can capture. Data at rest encrypted with AES-256 is not meaningfully threatened by quantum computing. The exception is stored material protected by a public key scheme, such as encrypted email archives or files encrypted to an RSA key, which share the same exposure as recorded traffic.

What Can I Deploy Today to Reduce the Risk?

Enable hybrid post-quantum key exchange on anything that supports it, starting with web servers, load balancers, VPN concentrators, and inter-site links. Move symmetric encryption to AES-256. Then map where long-lived confidential data crosses networks, and upgrade those paths first. All three steps are available now and require no new standards.

Do Signatures Need to Be Migrated as Urgently?

Less urgently for the recorded-traffic problem, because a signature cannot be forged retrospectively for a document that was already verified. The pressure on signatures comes from longevity instead: roots of trust, firmware signing keys, and long-term document signatures must still be valid when quantum computers exist, so hardware with fixed algorithms needs the longest lead time.

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