Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Golden SAML forges federation assertions using a stolen token-signing key, letting an attacker log in to any connected cloud service as any user, bypassing passwords and MFA entirely.

What Is Golden SAML?
Golden SAML is an attack in which an adversary who has obtained the token-signing private key of a federation server forges SAML assertions and uses them to authenticate to any service that trusts that identity provider. It was named and documented by Shaked Reiner at CyberArk in November 2017, and it became widely known three years later when it was used in the SolarWinds espionage campaign.
The parallel with the Golden Ticket attack is deliberate. In both cases, compromise of a single signing key lets the attacker mint credentials for anyone, for any resource, without further reference to the system that normally issues them.
In a federated sign-in, the service provider — Microsoft 365, AWS, Salesforce, a payroll system — does not authenticate the user. It redirects them to an identity provider, typically Active Directory Federation Services, Entra ID, Okta, or Ping. The identity provider authenticates the user, then issues a signed SAML assertion stating who they are and which groups they belong to. The service provider validates the signature against a public certificate it was configured with, and grants access.
Trust therefore rests entirely on that signature. The service provider has no independent way of knowing whether the identity provider really saw the user.
An attacker who reaches the federation server and extracts the token-signing private key can construct assertions themselves. The forged assertion names whichever user they wish, claims whichever roles they wish, and carries a valid signature.
The consequences are severe and specific:
Tooling is public: ADFSDump and ADFSpoof, released by Doug Bienstock and Austin Baker of Mandiant, extract the key material and generate assertions, and Mimikatz can retrieve the relevant secrets from AD FS.
In the 2020 intrusion campaign that followed the SolarWinds Orion backdoor, Golden SAML was one of the principal techniques used to pivot from on-premises networks into cloud tenants. Mandiant described it as one of four main tactics observed, and it was particularly effective because investigators initially looked for cloud sign-in anomalies and found none — the sign-ins had never happened.
Microsoft later documented a related technique, MagicWeb, in which the same group installed a malicious DLL on an AD FS server to manipulate claims during legitimate authentication, which is harder still to detect.
Detection depends on correlating two sources that most organisations keep separately.
Supporting signals include access to the AD FS configuration database or the DKM container in Active Directory, unusual service account activity on federation servers, assertions with abnormal lifetimes, and sign-ins from infrastructure inconsistent with the user’s pattern.
Identity provider and federation review forms part of our cloud security services, because the path from an on-premises compromise to the cloud tenant is now the one that matters most.
No. The forged assertion can itself claim that multi-factor authentication was performed, and the service provider has no way to verify that independently. Because the identity provider is never contacted, no challenge is issued to the real user. Conditional access requiring a compliant, managed device constrains the attack more effectively than additional authentication factors.
Golden Ticket forges Kerberos ticket-granting tickets using the stolen KRBTGT key and gives access across an on-premises Active Directory domain. Golden SAML forges federation assertions using a stolen token-signing key and gives access to cloud and SaaS applications that trust that identity provider. The underlying idea, compromise of a signing key, is the same.
Correlate the assertions your federation server recorded issuing, from AD FS events 1200 and 1202, against the federated sign-ins recorded by the cloud service provider. A sign-in in the cloud logs with no matching issuance on the federation server indicates a forged assertion. Both log sources must be collected and retained for the comparison to be possible.
Rotate the token-signing certificate twice, because AD FS retains the previous certificate and a single rotation leaves forged assertions valid. Review every application that trusts the identity provider, audit cloud activity for the full period the key may have been held, revoke sessions and refresh tokens, and investigate how the federation server was reached in the first place.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.