Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
FAST is the Turkish central bank’s instant payment system, settling transfers between banks in seconds around the clock, with an addressing service that lets people pay to a phone number.

What Is FAST, Turkey’s Instant Payment System?
FAST is the instant payment system operated by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, launched in January 2021. It moves funds between participating banks in seconds, operates continuously rather than in business hours, and applies a per-transaction cap set by the central bank and raised periodically. Alongside it sits an addressing service that lets a payer send money using a mobile telephone number, email address, or national identity number instead of an account number, and a national QR code standard for payments in person and online.
If that sounds like Faster Payments with extra features, it is, and the security consequences are the same ones UK banks spent a decade learning.
Traditional transfer systems had a built-in delay that functioned as an unintentional fraud control. Someone could realise their mistake, a bank could review a flagged payment, an investigator could place a hold. Instant settlement removes all of it. Once funds arrive, they can be moved onwards immediately through further instant transfers or withdrawn in cash, and recovery depends on reaching the receiving institution before a human being does.
That changes the engineering requirement. Fraud scoring must complete in the time budget of the payment itself, typically well under a second, which rules out any control that depends on a queue, a batch, or a person. It also changes the attacker’s economics: a compromised account can be emptied in a single session, so detection at the authentication layer matters more than detection at the transaction layer.
Instant payment fraud is overwhelmingly a matter of persuading the account holder to send the money themselves. The scripts are familiar across markets: a caller claiming to be from the bank’s fraud department asking the customer to move funds to a safe account, an investment opportunity with a deadline, a purchase that never arrives, an impersonated family member. These are authorised payments, correctly authenticated, that the customer later regrets, so authentication controls do nothing to prevent them.
Account takeover is the second pattern. Where it succeeds, the attacker typically adds a new beneficiary and drains the balance in minutes, which is why beneficiary addition deserves stronger treatment than the payment that follows it: out-of-band confirmation, a cooling-off period for the first transfer to a new payee, and limits that apply specifically to newly added beneficiaries.
Behind both sits the mule network. Funds land in accounts opened with stolen or synthetic identities, or in the accounts of people recruited to receive payments, and are layered onwards within minutes. Detecting mule receipt is a receiving-bank problem that mostly gets solved as a sending-bank problem, which is why inter-bank information sharing is the control with the highest leverage and the slowest adoption.
The UK runs Faster Payments through Pay.UK and has added two mechanisms worth comparing. Confirmation of Payee checks the name a payer types against the name on the receiving account and warns on a mismatch, which directly attacks impersonation and misdirection scams. Turkey’s addressing service performs a related function by resolving an alias to an account and displaying the registered holder, though the design and the user experience differ.
The second is reimbursement. Since 7 October 2024, the Payment Systems Regulator has required UK payment service providers to reimburse victims of authorised push payment scams in most circumstances, up to a maximum of £85,000, with the cost shared equally between the sending and receiving institutions. That single rule changed UK bank behaviour more than any technical guidance, because it gave receiving banks a direct financial interest in detecting mule accounts. The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 also gave providers the ability to delay a payment where there are reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, creating a lawful pause that instant systems otherwise lack.
Turkey has no equivalent mandatory reimbursement framework. Liability follows banking rules, consumer protection law, and litigation, so a Turkish bank’s incentive to invest in receiving-side detection is weaker. For a UK group operating a Turkish subsidiary, that asymmetry is worth modelling explicitly: the control expectations your UK entity is held to are not the baseline in Istanbul, and a group-wide fraud policy that assumes they are will be expensive in one direction or ineffective in the other.
At Privia Security, we help banks build the detection and response capability these systems require through our SOC maturation services.
Not unilaterally. Instant payments settle in seconds and are final, so recovery depends on contacting the receiving bank quickly enough that funds remain in the account and can be frozen pending investigation. In practice money is often moved onwards or withdrawn within minutes. That irreversibility is why prevention controls have to operate before the payment rather than after it.
Not in the exact UK form, but the addressing service performs a related function by letting a payer send to a mobile number, email address, or identity number and displaying the registered account holder for confirmation before the payment proceeds. The design and the warnings differ from the UK’s name-matching service, so do not assume equivalent protection against misdirection scams.
In the UK, the Payment Systems Regulator has required reimbursement of most authorised push payment scam victims since 7 October 2024, up to £85,000, with the cost split evenly between sending and receiving providers. Turkey has no equivalent mandatory framework, so liability depends on banking rules, consumer protection law, and the facts of the case. The difference materially changes bank incentives.
Friction at beneficiary addition rather than at every payment. Requiring out-of-band confirmation to add a payee, delaying the first transfer to a new beneficiary, and applying tighter limits to recently added payees interrupts both account takeover and scam payments, while leaving routine transfers to existing recipients fast. Generic warnings on every payment train customers to dismiss them.
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