Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
ARC preserves the email authentication verdict reached by the first receiver, so that mailing lists and forwarders do not destroy SPF and DKIM results on the way to the final inbox.

What Is Authenticated Received Chain?
Authenticated Received Chain, specified in RFC 8617 in July 2019, solves a problem that DMARC created. When a message passes through a mailing list or a forwarding service, the intermediary often rewrites the subject, appends a footer, or relays from its own servers. Those changes invalidate the DKIM signature and break SPF alignment, so a message that was perfectly legitimate when it left the sender arrives at the final destination failing authentication. ARC lets each intermediary record the verdict it reached and sign that record, giving the final receiver a cryptographically verifiable account of what happened upstream.
Every hop that participates adds a set of three headers, numbered with an instance value i=1, i=2, and so on.
Authentication-Results header.pass, fail, or none.The seal is what makes the structure a chain rather than a list. Because instance two seals over instance one, an intermediary cannot quietly rewrite an earlier verdict, and a receiver can detect a broken or truncated chain. Once any hop records cv=fail, the chain is dead and later hops must not revive it.
ARC does not override DMARC. It supplies evidence that a receiver may choose to weigh when DMARC fails.
The decision usually runs like this. Native authentication is evaluated first; if the message passes DMARC on its own, the chain is irrelevant. If it fails, the receiver validates the ARC chain, confirms the signatures, and reads the earliest ARC-Authentication-Results header. If that first hop recorded a DMARC pass, and the receiver trusts the sealer, the message can be delivered despite the current failure. Trust is the operative word: a chain sealed by a domain with no reputation buys nothing, which is why large providers maintain their own view of which sealers are worth believing.
Organisations stall at p=none for years because somebody in finance is on three industry mailing lists and nobody wants to be the person who caused those messages to disappear. ARC removes much of that excuse. The Internet Engineering Task Force’s own lists, Google Groups, and most modern list managers seal messages, as do Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace when they forward. Enabling ARC on your own forwarding infrastructure is therefore a prerequisite before you move a domain to p=reject, not an optional extra afterwards.
Microsoft 365 makes this explicit with its trusted ARC sealers list, where an administrator names the domains whose seals the tenant will honour. If your organisation runs a mail security gateway in front of Exchange Online, that gateway must seal and must appear on the list, or legitimate forwarded mail will keep failing.
You need ARC as a sealer if you modify or relay mail that you did not originate: a list server, a security gateway, a ticketing system that forwards, or an alumni-style address that redirects to a personal account. Generate a key pair, publish the public key in DNS exactly as you would for DKIM using a selector under _domainkey, and configure the mail transfer agent to seal. Current builds of Postfix with OpenARC, Exim, Rspamd, and PowerMTA all support it.
As a receiver, you mostly get ARC for free from your mail platform. The work is in deciding which external sealers to trust and in reading your DMARC aggregate reports to see which failures were rescued by a chain. Two caveats are worth holding on to. ARC asserts that an upstream hop believed the message was authentic; it does not assert that the hop is honest, so a compromised intermediary can seal malicious content with a valid chain. And ARC does nothing for spoofing that never involved a forwarder at all.
If you are planning a move to DMARC enforcement and want the forwarding paths mapped before you make it, our Email Security Solutions cover the full authentication stack.
No. ARC is a supplement that only becomes relevant when DMARC fails because an intermediary modified the message. SPF and DKIM still perform the original authentication, and DMARC still sets policy. A receiver consults the chain as additional evidence and may deliver a message that would otherwise be quarantined, but it may also ignore the chain entirely.
You publish an ARC key in DNS only if you seal messages, meaning you forward or modify mail you did not originate. The record uses the same format and the same _domainkey namespace as DKIM. If you only send mail from your own systems and never relay for others, you need no ARC record at all.
Gmail, Microsoft 365, and most large consumer mailbox providers validate chains and weigh them when DMARC fails. Microsoft 365 requires an administrator to add third-party sealers to a trusted ARC sealers list before their seals count. Smaller receivers vary, so ARC improves deliverability for forwarded mail but does not guarantee it everywhere.
Forging a seal requires the private key of the sealing domain, so the cryptography holds. The realistic risk is different: a legitimate but compromised or careless intermediary can seal a malicious message with a valid chain. This is why receivers maintain reputation-based trust lists for sealers rather than accepting any valid chain at face value.
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