Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Domestic cybersecurity products are security technologies developed in Turkey, which national policy and public procurement rules require or favour for government bodies and critical infrastructure.

What Are Domestic Cybersecurity Products in Turkey?
Turkey has made supply independence an explicit element of national security policy, and cybersecurity is one of the areas where that shows most clearly. For a UK organisation, the term matters in two situations: when a Turkish subsidiary cannot deploy the group security stack, and when a British vendor discovers that a Turkish public sector opportunity carries requirements it had not budgeted for.
The central instrument is the Information and Communication Security Guide, issued by the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency following a Presidential Circular in 2019 and in force since 2020. It applies to public institutions and to organisations providing critical infrastructure services, and it sets graded security measures by asset criticality. Two of its themes have direct procurement consequences: data generated in Turkey should be stored in Turkey, particularly for systems holding population-scale or critical data, and domestically produced solutions should be preferred where a capable one exists.
Public procurement rules reinforce it commercially. Turkish public procurement law allows a price advantage for domestic tenderers, so a local product can win a tender while quoting more than an imported equivalent. For defence programmes, SSB adds its own localisation expectations on top, which connects this subject directly to defence industry cybersecurity.
The domestic ecosystem is broader than most outside observers assume. TUBITAK BILGEM, the national research institute, develops cryptographic hardware and security products for government use and maintains Pardus, a Linux distribution deployed across public institutions. Commercial Turkish vendors supply SIEM, log management, data loss prevention, network access control, firewall, and email security products, several of which compete on features rather than on origin alone. Certification routes exist domestically: TSE operates a Common Criteria evaluation scheme recognised internationally, and products appear on nationally maintained approved lists.
Quality varies, as it does in every market. The useful question for a security architect is not whether a product is domestic but whether it has been evaluated, how quickly it issues fixes, and what the support arrangement looks like at three in the morning.
British policy has never used origin as the primary test. It uses assurance and targeted exclusion. NCSC runs product and service assurance schemes, Cyber Essentials sets a baseline for suppliers, and the Procurement Act 2023, in force from 24 February 2025, gives contracting authorities grounds to exclude suppliers on national security concerns. Where the UK has excluded technology, it has done so by naming it: the designation of high-risk vendors under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 required the removal of specified equipment from 5G networks on a published timetable, and government departments were instructed in 2022 to remove certain surveillance camera equipment from sensitive sites.
The difference is worth stating precisely, because it changes what evidence persuades a buyer. In the UK you demonstrate that a product is trustworthy. In Turkey, for in-scope buyers, you must also address where it was built and where its data lives. Neither approach is self-evidently superior, and both are responding to the same underlying concern about supply chain compromise.
There is a security argument in both directions, and it is worth holding honestly. Concentrating on products from one country reduces exposure to foreign interference and increases exposure to a smaller pool of scrutiny, fewer independent researchers, and slower disclosure. Diversity of supply has its own protective value. Whichever way a policy falls, the control that matters is the same: know what you are running, evaluate it properly, and test it in your own environment rather than trusting the badge on the box.
At Privia Security, we evaluate security products as deployed, domestic or otherwise, and assess compliance against Turkish and UK requirements through our regulation and compliance services.
It depends on scope. The Information and Communication Security Guide applies to public institutions and to organisations operating critical infrastructure services, where domestic preference and in-country data storage expectations apply. A private commercial subsidiary outside those categories generally has freedom of choice, subject to KVKK obligations on personal data and any sector regulator’s own rules, such as those applying to banks.
No general one. UK procurement is assurance-led rather than origin-led: NCSC product and service assurance, Cyber Essentials as a supplier baseline, and national security exclusion grounds under the Procurement Act 2023. Where the UK has restricted technology it has named it specifically, as with high-risk vendor designations in telecoms and the 2022 instruction on surveillance cameras at sensitive government sites.
Common Criteria evaluation through the scheme operated by TSE is the strongest signal, because it is an internationally recognised methodology with a defined protection profile and an independent laboratory. Beyond that, look for inclusion on nationally maintained approved product lists, a published vulnerability disclosure process, and a credible record of issuing fixes promptly, which tells you more about operational risk than any certificate.
Usually a hybrid. Most groups keep their global platform for the majority of the estate and add locally hosted or locally sourced components where Turkish requirements apply, then work to make both produce comparable telemetry into one monitoring function. Budget for that integration explicitly, because the alternative is a Turkish entity whose alerts never reach the group security operations centre.
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