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What Is the Pyramid of Pain?

The Pyramid of Pain ranks indicators by how much trouble it causes an attacker when you detect them, from throwaway file hashes at the bottom to behaviour at the top.

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17 November 2026

What Is the Pyramid of Pain?

What Is the Pyramid of Pain?

David J. Bianco published the Pyramid of Pain in 2013 to answer a question that still divides security teams: not “can we detect this?” but “how much does detecting it hurt the adversary?” The model sorts indicator types into six levels. The further up you detect, the more work the attacker has to redo, and the longer your detection keeps working.

The Six Levels

LevelIndicatorCost to the attacker
6TTPsTough
5ToolsChallenging
4Network and host artefactsAnnoying
3Domain namesSimple
2IP addressesEasy
1Hash valuesTrivial

Hash values. A SHA-256 of a malicious binary is exact and useless for long. Flipping a single byte, recompiling, or repacking produces a new hash in seconds. Fuzzy hashing such as ssdeep or TLSH survives small edits, which lifts it slightly, but the principle holds.

IP addresses. Blocking one costs an attacker the price of a new virtual machine—often nothing at all, since much command-and-control traffic now runs through cloud providers, compromised hosts, or residential proxies that you cannot block wholesale.

Domain names. Marginally more painful. Registration takes money and a few minutes, and domain generation algorithms automate the rest, but domains do leave registration trails that let you pivot to other infrastructure.

Network and host artefacts. Now it starts to bite. A distinctive URI pattern, a hard-coded user agent, a specific mutex name, a registry key used for persistence, a JA3 or JA4 TLS fingerprint—these are properties of the tooling rather than of one deployment, so changing them means changing the tool.

Tools. Detecting the tool itself—a Cobalt Strike beacon by its default sleep and jitter pattern, Mimikatz by the way it opens LSASS, a specific web shell by its structure—forces the adversary to find or build a replacement and learn it. That is weeks, not minutes.

TTPs. At the top sits behaviour: how the adversary operates regardless of tooling. Dumping credentials from LSASS, creating a scheduled task for persistence, abusing a signed binary to run code, exfiltrating to cloud storage over HTTPS during working hours. To defeat a behavioural detection, the attacker must change how they work.

Why Hash Feeds Disappoint

Many organisations measure their threat intelligence programme by the number of indicators ingested, and most of those indicators sit in the bottom two levels. They expire quickly, they generate little detection value, and they create a false sense of coverage. The Cl0p campaign against MOVEit Transfer in mid-2023 is instructive: web shell hashes changed between victims, but the behaviour—an unexpected process spawned by the web service, followed by bulk database reads—was consistent and detectable without any feed at all.

This is not an argument for discarding low-level indicators. They are cheap, fast, and perfect for retrospective hunting: when a new report lands, sweeping six months of logs for its hashes and addresses tells you quickly whether you were touched. Use them for triage and enrichment; do not mistake them for detection coverage.

Climbing the Pyramid

Using It With Other Models

The pyramid describes indicator durability; it does not describe an intrusion. Pair it with the Diamond Model, which shows where to pivot between adversary, capability, infrastructure, and victim, and with ATT&CK, which names the behaviours you are trying to catch at the top of the pyramid. Together they turn a list of indicators of compromise into a detection strategy.

If your detection library needs an honest audit of where it sits on the pyramid, our SOC maturation services start there.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Should We Stop Using Hash-Based Indicators?

No, but treat them as retrospective tools rather than defences. Hashes and addresses are cheap to collect and excellent for sweeping historical logs after a new report is published, and for enriching an alert once it fires. The mistake is counting them as detection coverage, because an attacker invalidates them by recompiling or renting a new server.

What Counts as a TTP Rather Than an Artefact?

An artefact is a trace a particular tool leaves—a mutex name, a user agent string, a registry key. A TTP is the behaviour itself, such as dumping credentials from process memory, establishing persistence through a scheduled task, or exfiltrating data to a cloud storage provider. Changing an artefact means editing the tool; changing a TTP means changing the tradecraft.

How Do We Measure Progress Up the Pyramid?

Tag every detection rule with its indicator level and review the distribution quarterly. Then validate by emulation: run the same technique with two different tools and see which rules still fire. Rules that survive the tool change are genuinely at the top levels; those that do not were tool detections wearing a behavioural label.

Is the Pyramid of Pain the Same as MITRE ATT&CK?

No, they do different jobs. ATT&CK is a structured knowledge base of adversary techniques, organised by tactic. The Pyramid of Pain is a prioritisation model that ranks indicator types by how costly they are for an attacker to change. ATT&CK tells you which behaviours exist; the pyramid tells you why detecting behaviour beats detecting a hash.

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