Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
NAT rewrites addresses as packets cross a boundary, letting many hosts share one public address. It was designed to conserve addresses, not to provide security.

What Is Network Address Translation?
Network address translation rewrites the addresses, and usually the ports, in packet headers as they cross a boundary. Its original purpose, set out in RFC 1631 in 1994 and refined in RFC 3022, was arithmetic: IPv4 has about 4.3 billion addresses and the internet needed more. NAT let an organisation run thousands of hosts on private addresses from RFC 1918 behind a handful of public ones. Three decades later it is in nearly every network, and a great deal of confusion persists about what security it does and does not provide.
Source NAT, also called masquerading, rewrites the source address of outbound packets to the gateway’s public address. Almost always this is port address translation, where the source port is also rewritten so that many internal hosts share one public address, distinguished by port number in the translation table.
Destination NAT, which includes port forwarding, rewrites the destination of inbound packets so that traffic arriving at a public address and port is delivered to an internal host.
Static NAT maps one internal address to one public address in both directions, typically for a server that must be reachable and must also originate traffic from a predictable address.
Carrier-grade NAT applies the same technique at provider scale, sharing one public address among hundreds of subscribers. UK mobile networks and many broadband providers use it.
The common claim is that NAT hides internal hosts and therefore protects them. There is a grain of truth: an inbound connection to an internal host has no translation entry to match, so it is dropped. That is a side effect of the translation table, not a policy decision, and it fails in several ways.
The point matters practically because IPv6 networks usually have no NAT at all, and an organisation that believed NAT was its perimeter discovers that every internal host is globally routable. The control was always the stateful firewall policy, and that must be configured explicitly for IPv6.
Attribution. This is the serious one. When two hundred users share one public address, a log entry recording that address identifies the organisation, not the person. Incident investigation, abuse reports, and law enforcement requests all require the translation logs to resolve an external observation to an internal host, and those logs are high-volume and frequently not kept. Under carrier-grade NAT the problem scales up: RFC 6888 recommends logging, and attributing activity to a subscriber requires the source port and a precise timestamp as well as the address.
Protocols that embed addresses. FTP in active mode, SIP, and IPsec AH carry addressing inside the payload, so they need application-layer gateways or fail outright.
End-to-end transparency. Applications cannot assume a host is reachable, which has shaped protocol design for decades.
Log translations if you can, with enough detail to map an external address and port at a given time back to an internal host, and retain them in line with your incident response needs. Keep them as personal data under UK GDPR with a stated retention period. Size the translation table: port exhaustion under PAT produces failures that look like network problems and are hard to diagnose, so monitor table utilisation.
Most importantly, write the firewall policy as though NAT were absent. Deny inbound by default, control outbound to known destinations and ports, disable UPnP on anything corporate, and apply the same discipline to IPv6 where no translation exists to create an accidental barrier. Our Network Security Services test the perimeter against what the policy claims rather than what the topology implies.
Only incidentally. Unsolicited inbound connections are dropped because no translation entry matches them, which resembles a firewall but is a side effect rather than a policy. NAT does not inspect traffic, does not control outbound connections, and can be bypassed by UPnP requests and hole punching. The security comes from the stateful firewall rules, which must be configured deliberately.
IPv6 has enough addresses that translation is unnecessary, so hosts typically have globally routable addresses. Organisations that assumed NAT was protecting internal systems find that assumption gone. Write explicit IPv6 firewall policy before enabling it, and remember that many devices enable IPv6 by default, so an unconfigured IPv6 path can exist on a network you believe is IPv4 only.
External logs record the shared public address, which identifies your organisation but not the device. Mapping that back to an internal host requires translation logs containing the address, port, and timestamp. These are high volume and often not retained, so by the time an abuse report or threat intelligence hit arrives, the evidence linking it to a host has gone.
On corporate networks, yes. UPnP and NAT-PMP let any internal device create its own inbound port forward without approval, which malware uses to expose services and which turns an internal compromise into an externally reachable one. Disable it on routers and firewalls, and handle legitimate inbound requirements through reviewed, documented rules instead.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.