Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A timestamping authority is a trusted third party that cryptographically attests when data existed, so a signature stays verifiable long after the signing certificate has expired.

What Is a Timestamping Authority?
A digital signature answers who signed something. It does not, on its own, answer when—and the two questions are linked, because a signing certificate is only valid for a few years. A timestamping authority, or TSA, is a trusted third party that signs a statement attesting that a particular piece of data existed at a particular moment. Add that attestation to a signature and the signature remains verifiable long after the certificate behind it has expired or been revoked.
The mechanism is defined in RFC 3161, the Time-Stamp Protocol, with extensions in RFC 5816.
Everything rests on the TSA’s clock and its key. Accredited providers synchronise to a traceable time source such as UTC(NPL), maintained by the National Physical Laboratory in Teddington, and hold the signing key in a hardware security module.
Consider a driver signed in 2023 with a certificate that expires in 2026. Without a timestamp, every installation after that date fails validation, because the verifier can only ask whether the certificate is valid now. With a countersignature from a TSA, the verifier asks a different question: was the certificate valid at the moment of signing? The answer stays yes indefinitely.
That property has a sharp edge. When a code-signing key is stolen, revocation normally has to be backdated to before the compromise, invalidating legitimate software signed earlier. This is why Microsoft, Apple, and the Linux package ecosystems all require or strongly recommend timestamped signatures, and why code signing certificates are now issued only on hardware tokens.
The advanced signature formats—CAdES for binary data, XAdES for XML, PAdES for PDF—build on timestamps to create signatures designed to last decades. A long-term validation profile embeds the full certificate chain, the revocation data current at signing time, and a document timestamp. Before the TSA’s own certificate or the hash algorithm weakens, an archive timestamp is applied over the whole structure, chaining the evidence forward. ETSI EN 319 422 and the related standards specify how this is done, and it is how twenty-five-year contract archives stay provable.
Under the UK eIDAS Regulation, retained and amended after EU exit, a qualified electronic time stamp from a qualified trust service provider carries a legal presumption of the accuracy of the date and time it indicates, and of the integrity of the data it covers. A non-qualified timestamp is still admissible, but the party relying on it must evidence those points itself. The Information Commissioner’s Office supervises UK trust service providers and maintains the UK Trust Services List, which is where you check whether a provider is actually qualified.
One practical trap for organisations working across borders: a timestamp qualified under EU eIDAS is not automatically qualified in the UK, and the reverse is also true. If a contract or regulatory filing depends on the legal presumption, confirm which list the provider appears on before relying on it.
No. The protocol sends only a hash of the data, so the TSA receives a fixed-length value from which the original cannot be recovered. It signs that hash together with the time and returns a token. This is why timestamping is acceptable for confidential contracts, source code, and legal filings without any confidentiality agreement with the provider.
Existing tokens remain verifiable as long as the TSA’s certificate chain and revocation data are still available, which is why long-term validation formats embed them with the signature. Problems arise when that evidence was never captured. Before a provider winds down or its certificate expires, apply an archive timestamp from a current authority over the whole structure.
It proves that data existed before a given block, which is useful and needs no trusted third party. What it does not give you is a legal presumption under UK eIDAS, accurate wall-clock time rather than block ordering, or compatibility with the signature formats that courts, regulators, and software platforms expect. The two approaches complement each other rather than competing.
Only where the legal presumption matters, typically contracts, regulated filings, and long-term archives governed by UK or EU law. For routine code signing, document integrity, and evidence handling, a reputable non-qualified RFC 3161 service from your certificate authority is normally sufficient and considerably cheaper to use at volume.
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