Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A SYN flood abuses the TCP three-way handshake, filling a server’s backlog queue with half-open connections from spoofed addresses until legitimate clients can no longer connect.

What Is a SYN Flood Attack?
Every TCP connection starts with a three-step negotiation. The client sends SYN, the server replies SYN-ACK and reserves memory for the pending connection, and the client completes the exchange with ACK. A SYN flood attacks the gap between the second and third steps: the attacker sends SYN packets and never answers, leaving the server holding half-open connections until its backlog queue is full and new clients are refused.
The technique is old enough to have its own folklore. In September 1996, the New York ISP Panix was knocked offline for days by a SYN flood, an incident that prompted Daniel J. Bernstein to design SYN cookies. Three decades later it still appears in most large DDoS campaigns, usually as one vector among several.
Asymmetry is what makes the attack efficient. A SYN packet is 40 to 60 bytes and costs the sender almost nothing. The server, by contrast, must allocate a transmission control block, record the sequence numbers, send a SYN-ACK, and hold that state while it waits. It then retransmits the SYN-ACK several times, typically five, with exponential backoff, which on Linux keeps the entry alive for over a minute.
Source addresses are usually spoofed, for two reasons. It hides the attacker, and it guarantees no reply arrives, because the real owner of that address responds to an unexpected SYN-ACK with a RST that tidies the entry away. Spoofing also makes simple source-based blocking useless, which is the main practical difference from a Slowloris attack, where the attacker must use real addresses.
A related variant, the SYN-ACK reflection attack, sends spoofed SYN packets to many third-party servers with the victim’s address as the source, so the victim is buried under their SYN-ACK replies. It is a reflection technique rather than a state-exhaustion one, but the packets look similar on a capture.
The signature is a large population of connections in the SYN_RECV state. On Linux:
ss -n state syn-recv | wc -l
Supporting signals include a sharp rise in inbound packets per second with low average packet size, kernel log entries reading “possible SYN flooding on port 443, sending cookies”, a flat or falling count of completed connections while SYN counts climb, and source addresses spread evenly across the whole IPv4 range, which no legitimate traffic pattern produces.
SYN cookies remove the need to hold state at all. Instead of storing the pending connection, the server encodes the connection details and a timestamp into the initial sequence number it sends in the SYN-ACK, then discards everything. If a valid ACK arrives, the acknowledgement number carries the cookie back and the server reconstructs the connection from it. An attacker who never replies therefore costs the server nothing but a packet.
On Linux, net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is enabled by default and activates only when the backlog fills, so it does not affect normal operation. The trade-off is that a few TCP options, including window scaling and selective acknowledgement, may be lost on cookie-established connections, which is a small price during an attack.
Layer these alongside it:
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog and the listen backlog of the application, so there is more headroom before cookies engage;net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries from the default of five, so abandoned entries expire sooner;For UK operators of essential services, availability is an explicit obligation under the NIS Regulations, and the NCSC’s denial-of-service guidance expects you to have agreed mitigation arrangements with your provider before an incident rather than during one. Our DoS and DDoS Testing Services measure where your real limits sit and confirm that those arrangements work under load.
A SYN flood exhausts a state table rather than a link, so it can succeed with modest bandwidth. A volumetric attack aims to saturate your internet connection with sheer traffic volume, which no server-side tuning can fix. Large campaigns combine both, which is why host hardening and an upstream scrubbing arrangement address different halves of the same problem.
They discard the information normally stored for a pending connection, so some TCP options negotiated in the SYN packet, such as window scaling and selective acknowledgement, cannot always be preserved. That can slightly reduce throughput on affected connections. Since Linux activates cookies only when the backlog is full, the trade-off applies during attacks rather than in normal operation.
A firewall or load balancer with SYN proxy capability helps considerably, because it completes the handshake itself and forwards only connections that prove to be real. It cannot help once the attack volume exceeds the capacity of your internet link, since the packets have already consumed the bandwidth before reaching you. That case needs upstream scrubbing.
Compare half-open connections against completed ones. A genuine spike raises both; a SYN flood raises SYN_RECV counts while established connections stay flat or fall. Source addresses are also revealing: real traffic clusters in a few networks and countries, whereas spoofed floods are distributed evenly across the address space, including ranges that are not routable.
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