Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Mobile app permissions are the consent gates between an app and the camera, microphone, location, contacts, and files on a device—and over-requesting them is a risk in its own right.

What Are Mobile App Permissions?
A permission is the gate between an app and something the operating system considers worth protecting: the camera, the microphone, precise location, contacts, health records, files, notifications. The app declares what it wants, the user decides, and the platform enforces the answer. Over-requesting—asking for far more than the feature set needs—is one of the most common findings in any mobile assessment.
Android gave up install-time consent in version 6.0. Dangerous permissions are now requested in context, at the moment the feature is used, and the user can grant them once only, while the app is in use, or permanently. Android 11 added automatic revocation for apps left unused for a few months, Android 12 let users hand over approximate rather than precise location, Android 13 made notifications a runtime permission, and Android 14 introduced partial photo access so a user can share three pictures instead of a library.
iOS reached a similar place by a different route. Apple has always prompted at point of use, then layered on App Tracking Transparency in iOS 14.5, which requires explicit consent before an app reads the advertising identifier; limited photo library access; and from 2024, privacy manifests that declare why an app calls certain APIs. Both stores back their models with policy: Google restricts SMS, call log, and QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES access to apps whose core function needs it, and Apple rejects submissions whose purpose strings are vague.
Excess permissions create three distinct problems.
Malware exploits the model directly. Android banking trojans such as Anatsa and Hook request the accessibility service, which is designed for assistive technology and grants the ability to read screen content and inject input—effectively a legitimate permission that functions as remote control. Google now requires a declaration justifying accessibility use, but droppers still reach the store.
A review that stops at the permission list misses the interesting part. On Android, exported activities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers let other apps on the device invoke functionality without any permission at all unless you set one. Unvalidated deep links do the same across the network boundary, as our article on deep link vulnerabilities shows. The principle is the same one you apply on the server: grant the least privilege that works, and prove the boundary holds.
For corporate devices, permission decisions do not have to be left to staff. Android Enterprise lets an administrator pre-grant or permanently deny specific runtime permissions for managed apps, and iOS supervised devices can restrict camera, microphone, and screen recording outright. On BYOD handsets your reach is narrower, which is where mobile application management replaces device-level control with app-level containment.
Procurement is the other lever. Before an app reaches the fleet, ask what it requests, which SDKs are embedded, and where the resulting data goes—questions a short app vetting exercise answers in hours.
Two rules apply at once. UK GDPR requires data minimisation under Article 5(1)(c), so a permission is only defensible if the processing behind it is necessary for a stated purpose. Separately, Regulation 6 of PECR governs storing or accessing information on a user’s terminal equipment, which covers device identifiers and SDK storage, not just website cookies—consent there is needed even where UK GDPR might allow legitimate interests. The ICO’s guidance on apps is explicit that a bundled, all-or-nothing permission request is not valid consent.
Our Mobile Application Security Services include a permission and SDK review that maps every grant your app holds to the feature that actually needs it.
Usually because of embedded SDKs. Advertising, analytics, and attribution libraries request location, device identifiers, or storage for their own purposes, and the host app inherits those declarations. Sometimes it is simply legacy code from a removed feature. Either way the user sees one request, so developers should audit the merged manifest rather than only the permissions they wrote themselves.
On managed devices, yes. Android Enterprise supports a permission grant policy that can auto-grant or auto-deny specific runtime permissions for managed apps, and supervised iOS devices can disable the camera, microphone, or screen recording through restrictions. On unmanaged personal devices you cannot set permissions directly, so containment through app protection policies becomes the practical control.
It is the most powerful grant on the platform. An accessibility service can read everything on screen and inject taps and text, which is exactly what assistive software needs and exactly what banking trojans abuse to capture credentials and authorise transfers. Treat any request for it from a non-assistive app as a red flag, and block such apps on managed devices.
Not on their own. A platform prompt shows that the user allowed technical access; it does not establish a lawful basis for the processing that follows, nor record the purpose. You still need a privacy notice describing what is collected and why, and under PECR you need consent for storing or reading information on the device. Granular, purpose-specific requests are far easier to defend.
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