Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
OT and IT teams have different objectives, change processes, and vocabularies, and most industrial security failures trace back to that gap rather than to any missing technology.

How Do OT and IT Teams Work Together?
Ask an IT security manager what an asset is and the answer involves a server, a laptop, or an identity. Ask a plant engineer and the answer is a compressor. Both are right, both are using their industry’s standard vocabulary, and the gap between those two answers is where most industrial security programmes get stuck.
The disagreement is not really about words. It is about what each group is accountable for. IT is measured on confidentiality, data protection, and service delivery. Engineering is measured on availability, safety, product quality, and regulatory compliance for the process. When those objectives conflict, as they do over patching, scanning, and remote access, neither team is being unreasonable.
Programmes that treat this as educating engineers about phishing fail. The traffic has to run in both directions. IT and security staff who will work on a plant should complete the site safety induction, understand permit-to-work, and walk the process with an engineer before they propose anything. Engineers benefit from understanding credential reuse, how ransomware actually arrives, and why the laptop that moves between the office and the control room is a genuine problem.
Secondments work better than training. A security analyst who spends a fortnight in a control room learns more about alarm floods and operator workload than any course will teach, and comes back able to write detection rules that engineers will not immediately disable.
The first is IT pushing standard tooling into the plant without consultation: an agent deployed by policy to an operator station, a scan that takes down a line, a password policy that locks out a console during an upset. One of these sets the relationship back a year.
The second is engineering solving an operational problem quietly: a 4G router installed so a vendor can support a machine, a USB drive used to move recipes, a laptop that lives on both networks. Neither is malicious; both are rational responses to a process that did not offer a legitimate alternative. The answer is to provide the legitimate alternative, which usually means a monitored remote access gateway and a sanctioned file transfer path, as described under OT security.
Exercises are the fastest way to find both. A scenario run with the control room, the SOC, and the incident management team in the same room surfaces the authority gaps, the communication assumptions, and the undocumented connections in an afternoon.
At Privia Security, we run joint OT and IT scenarios with operational teams through our Cyber Exercise Services.
The most durable arrangement gives the system owner role to engineering, with the security function setting standards, providing monitoring, and holding the assurance view. A purely IT-owned model produces requirements that plants quietly ignore; a purely engineering-owned model loses the security expertise. What matters most is that one named person is accountable and that the reporting line is written down.
Risk-based and vendor-validated, batched into planned outages rather than applied on an enterprise cycle. Between windows, compensating controls carry the risk: application allow-listing, network segmentation, restricted removable media, and monitoring. Document which vulnerabilities remain unpatched and why, because that record is what a regulator and an insurer will ask for.
Many field devices have minimal network stacks and respond badly to traffic patterns that modern servers ignore, with documented cases of controllers halting under a routine scan. In a plant that means lost production or a safety event. Passive monitoring on a tap or span port gives most of the same inventory and vulnerability information without touching the devices.
A shared asset register, followed by a documented decision about who may disconnect the plant from the corporate network and under what circumstances. Neither requires budget approval, both surface the disagreements that would otherwise appear during an incident, and almost everything else in the programme depends on knowing what you have and who decides.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.