Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
The Cyber Kill Chain is Lockheed Martin’s seven-stage model of a targeted intrusion, from reconnaissance to actions on objectives, used to find where defenders can break an attack.

What Is the Cyber Kill Chain?
The Cyber Kill Chain is a model that describes a targeted cyberattack as a sequence of seven stages, from the attacker’s first research into a target to the moment they achieve their goal. Lockheed Martin researchers published it in 2011, adapting the military idea of a “kill chain” to network intrusions. Its central insight is that defenders do not need to stop every step—breaking any single link can stop the attack.
| Stage | What the attacker does | Example controls |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Reconnaissance | Researches staff, technology, and exposed services | Reduce public footprint, monitor scanning, OSINT reviews |
| 2. Weaponisation | Pairs an exploit or payload with a delivery vehicle, such as a malicious document | Largely invisible; threat intelligence on current tooling |
| 3. Delivery | Sends the payload by email, web, USB, or a supplier channel | Email filtering, web proxies, attachment sandboxing, user reporting |
| 4. Exploitation | Triggers a vulnerability or user action to run code | Patching, macro controls, exploit protection |
| 5. Installation | Establishes persistence on the compromised host | EDR, application allow-listing, monitoring of autoruns and services |
| 6. Command and Control | Opens a channel back to attacker infrastructure | Egress filtering, DNS monitoring, proxy inspection |
| 7. Actions on Objectives | Steals data, encrypts systems, or disrupts operations | DLP, segmentation, backups, rapid incident response |
The original paper also proposed a “courses of action” matrix, asking for each stage whether a control can detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, or destroy. That matrix is still one of the most practical ways to use the model.
The most useful exercise is a coverage map. List the seven stages as rows and your controls as columns, then record for each cell what the control actually does, which log it produces, and whether an alert fires. In most organisations the result is lopsided: heavy investment in delivery (email security, web filtering) and much thinner coverage after a host is compromised. That imbalance explains why so many breaches are discovered late—there was simply nothing watching the command and control and exfiltration stages.
Fill the map with evidence, not assumptions. A control that exists but never alerts does not count. Purple Team exercises are a good way to test each cell: run a technique, see whether it was logged and detected, and update the map.
The model also gives security leaders a clear way to explain an incident to a board. “The attacker was stopped at installation” is easier to grasp than a list of technique IDs.
The Kill Chain was built around external, malware-based intrusions, and critics have pointed out several gaps:
Because of these limits, most mature teams pair the Kill Chain with MITRE ATT&CK. ATT&CK breaks behaviour down into tactics and hundreds of specific techniques—for example Phishing (T1566) at delivery or Application Layer Protocol (T1071) at command and control—which makes it far better for writing detection rules and planning threat hunts. The Unified Kill Chain, published by Paul Pols in 2017, merges both ideas into a longer sequence that better reflects how attackers move inside networks. The Diamond Model complements them by focusing on the relationships between adversary, capability, infrastructure, and victim.
A sensible division of labour is to use the Kill Chain for strategy and communication, and ATT&CK for engineering and testing.
The fastest way to learn where your chain is weak is to watch a realistic adversary try to walk it. Our Red Team services follow the full sequence against your environment and show, stage by stage, where your defences detected the activity and where they did not.
Yes, as a high-level model. It remains an effective way to explain how attacks progress, organise controls, and report to leadership. It is less useful on its own for detection engineering, because it does not describe specific attacker behaviour in enough detail. Most teams now use it alongside MITRE ATT&CK, which provides the technique-level granularity that SOC analysts and threat hunters need.
The earlier the better, because every stage the attacker completes increases potential damage and recovery cost. In practice, delivery and exploitation are where preventive controls are strongest. However, no organisation blocks everything at the perimeter, so strong detection at installation and command and control is what turns a potential breach into a contained incident.
A typical ransomware intrusion begins with reconnaissance and delivery through phishing, stolen credentials, or an exposed service, followed by exploitation, installation of a loader or remote access tool, and command and control. Operators then spend days moving laterally and stealing data before deploying encryption, which is the actions on objectives stage. That long middle phase is the defender’s best opportunity to intervene.
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