Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Cosign is the signing client of the Sigstore project. It signs container images, SBOMs, and arbitrary files, and supports keyless signing tied to an identity rather than a long-lived private key.

What Is Cosign?
Cosign is the command-line signing tool of the Sigstore project. It signs and verifies container images, software bills of materials, provenance attestations, and ordinary files, and stores the resulting signatures in the same OCI registry as the artefact they describe. Its defining feature is keyless signing: instead of guarding a long-lived private key, you prove an identity through OpenID Connect and receive a certificate that is valid for ten minutes.
Traditional code signing fails on operations, not cryptography. A build pipeline needs a private key; the key must live somewhere the pipeline can read it; anyone who can modify the pipeline can read it too; and when it leaks, every signature ever made with it becomes suspect. Hardware security modules help and are expensive. Most organisations simply never sign anything.
Keyless signing changes the question. The build job authenticates to Fulcio, Sigstore’s certificate authority, with an OIDC token from its platform — for GitHub Actions that token names the repository, workflow file, branch, and trigger. Fulcio issues a short-lived X.509 certificate binding the public key to that identity. Cosign signs, records the signature and certificate in the Rekor transparency log, and the private key is discarded. There is nothing left to steal.
Keyless signing inside a workflow needs little more than the right permissions and one command:
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/api@sha256:1f2b...c9
Verification is where the discipline lies, because the flags carry the entire security property:
cosign verify ghcr.io/acme/api@sha256:1f2b...c9 \
--certificate-identity=https://github.com/acme/api/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/heads/main \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
Without both identity flags, you are confirming only that somebody signed the image, which is close to worthless — anyone with a GitHub account can sign anything. Always pin by digest rather than tag as well, since a tag can be moved to a different image after verification.
Key-based signing remains available with cosign generate-key-pair and --key, including keys held in cloud KMS or on hardware, and is still the right choice for air-gapped environments where no public OIDC provider is reachable.
One further flag matters in continuous integration. By default a keyless verification consults the public Rekor instance over the network, so a build that must work offline needs the relevant transparency log entry bundled with the artefact, which Cosign can attach as a signature bundle. Teams discover this the first time a release pipeline runs inside a restricted network and every verification step times out.
A signature says an identity vouched for a digest. An attestation says something specific about it. Cosign attaches signed statements in the in-toto format:
cosign attest --predicate sbom.cdx.json --type cyclonedx ghcr.io/acme/api@sha256:1f2b...c9
The same mechanism carries SLSA provenance, vulnerability scan results, and custom predicates such as “this image passed the staging test suite”. Verification policies can then insist not merely that an image is signed, but that it carries an SBOM and provenance from an approved builder, which is what SLSA levels are built on.
Signing changes nothing until something refuses unsigned artefacts. In Kubernetes that means an admission controller: Kyverno through its image verification rules, the Sigstore policy-controller, or Connaisseur. A realistic rollout runs in audit mode first, because the first enforcement attempt invariably discovers base images, sidecars, and vendor agents that nobody signs.
Adoption is now broad enough that verification is practical. Kubernetes has signed its release artefacts with Cosign since version 1.24 in May 2022, npm package provenance became generally available in April 2023, and many vendor images ship signatures by default.
A valid signature means a particular identity produced this exact artefact and the fact was recorded publicly. It says nothing about whether the code is safe, the dependencies are current, or the build machine was clean. Compromise the pipeline and you get a perfectly valid signature on a malicious image, which is precisely the lesson of the supply chain incidents that motivated the project. Signing is the audit trail; reproducible builds, hardened builders, and dependency review are the control.
Alongside the image in the same OCI registry. Historically Cosign pushed a separate tag derived from the image digest, and newer registries supporting the OCI 1.1 referrers API store the signature as a linked artefact instead. Either way no additional infrastructure is needed, though your registry must allow the pipeline to push these extra objects, which some tightly locked-down registries block by default.
Nothing breaks. Fulcio certificates last about ten minutes by design, which is long enough to sign and no longer. Verification does not require the certificate to be currently valid; it checks that the signature was made while the certificate was valid, using the timestamped entry in the Rekor transparency log. This is why keyless signing works without the revocation infrastructure that conventional code signing needs.
Yes. You can sign with a conventional key pair, including one held in AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Google Cloud KMS, or on a hardware token, which avoids the public instance entirely. Organisations that want keyless signing in a closed environment can run their own Fulcio and Rekor instances, and several vendors package exactly that for regulated and air-gapped deployments.
No. A signature proves provenance, not quality. It tells you which identity produced the artefact and that the artefact has not changed since, which is extremely useful during an incident and when enforcing that only your own pipeline can deploy. It tells you nothing about vulnerable dependencies, embedded secrets, or malicious code added upstream of the build, all of which need separate controls.
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