Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Business continuity in healthcare is the planning that keeps clinical services running when systems fail, covering downtime procedures, recovery priorities, and the decisions clinicians make without IT.

What Is Business Continuity in Healthcare?
Continuity planning in a hospital answers a question no other industry has to ask in quite the same way: what do clinicians do, right now, for the patient in front of them, while the systems are down. Everything else follows from that. Recovery time objectives, backup architecture, and supplier contracts matter, but they matter because they shorten the period during which a ward is working on paper.
WannaCry reached the NHS on 12 May 2017. The National Audit Office later recorded that at least 80 of 236 trusts in England were affected, along with several hundred GP practices, around 19,000 appointments and operations were cancelled, and some trusts diverted ambulances. The malware was not aimed at healthcare; the damage came from unpatched systems and from clinical equipment that could not simply be rebuilt.
Ireland’s Health Service Executive was hit by Conti ransomware on 14 May 2021. The national health service shut down its IT estate deliberately to contain the attack, and recovery took months rather than weeks. The independent post-incident review published that December is the most useful public document on healthcare continuity in existence, chiefly because it is candid about how much of the organisation’s resilience depended on staff improvising.
Closest to home, the attack on Synnovis on 3 June 2024 took down pathology services for King’s College Hospital and Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trusts in south-east London. Thousands of appointments and procedures were postponed over the following weeks, and because blood group testing was affected, NHS Blood and Transplant issued a national appeal for O-type blood donors. It is the clearest recent demonstration that a supplier failure can become a clinical emergency.
Start with a business impact analysis at service level, not at system level. For each clinical service, establish how long it can operate without each supporting system, what the workaround is, and what the workaround costs in staff time and risk. That exercise produces recovery time and recovery point objectives that reflect patient safety rather than IT convenience.
Then test it where it will fail. A plan that assumes printed records will be available ignores the fact that printing usually depends on the same network. A plan that assumes staff can telephone the laboratory ignores that extension numbers live in the intranet. Full-day exercises involving real clinical teams, with telephony and printing deliberately removed, find these dependencies in a way that a desktop review will not.
Supplier continuity deserves its own analysis after Synnovis. Ask which clinical services depend on which third party, what that supplier’s recovery commitment actually is in the contract, and what you would do for the first fortnight if they were unavailable. Diagnostics, managed imaging, dispensing robots, and outsourced transcription all deserve the question.
In England, NHS organisations are category one responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and work to NHS England’s Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response core standards. They are also designated under the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, assessed against NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework, and complete the Data Security and Protection Toolkit annually. ISO 22301 provides the management system most providers map their plans against.
Turkish hospitals plan under Ministry of Health rules and the national disaster response structure, where continuity planning carries a strong physical dimension: the earthquakes of 6 February 2023 made facility survivability, off-site record availability, and staff mobilisation central to every Turkish continuity plan in a way that UK planning assumptions do not require. Groups operating in both markets should expect the cyber scenarios to transfer and the physical ones not to.
At Privia Security, we build and rehearse healthcare continuity and response plans with clinical and technical teams together through our emergency action plan services.
Longer than most plans assume. Ransomware recoveries in healthcare have routinely run for weeks, and the Irish Health Service Executive took months to restore fully. Planning for 72 hours is the common starting point, but a credible plan should set out how operations continue at two weeks, including how paper records created during the outage are reconciled into the electronic record afterwards.
Printed and current versions of the forms a ward cannot work without: drug charts, observation and early warning score charts, fluid balance sheets, pathology and radiology request slips, transfusion documentation, and a printed contact list with direct dial numbers. Kits need an owner, a review date, and a location everyone knows, because the intranet page explaining where they are will also be unavailable.
Clinically, yes. The Synnovis attack in June 2024 took down pathology for two major London trusts, and the consequences, from postponed operations to a national blood appeal, fell on the hospitals and their patients. Contractual recovery commitments do not restore a service on their own, so continuity planning has to cover what the organisation does during a prolonged third-party outage.
Clinical leadership, informed by the business impact analysis, with IT advising on what is technically possible in what order. The priority list should be agreed in advance and signed off by the medical director, because making that decision under pressure, with every department arguing its case, wastes hours that matter. Review the list annually as services and dependencies change.
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