Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a well-resourced, usually state-linked group that targets specific organisations and stays hidden in their networks for months to steal data or cause disruption.

What Is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)?
An advanced persistent threat (APT) is a skilled, well-resourced attacker—most often a state-sponsored group—that picks a specific target, gains access quietly, and stays inside the network for as long as it takes to achieve its goal. That goal is usually espionage, intellectual property theft, or pre-positioning for future disruption rather than a quick payout. The term also describes the campaign itself, not just the group behind it.
The phrase is usually credited to US Air Force analysts in the mid-2000s, and it entered mainstream security vocabulary with Mandiant’s 2013 APT1 report, which linked a long-running espionage campaign to the Chinese military’s Unit 61398. Each word in the name carries meaning:
This is what separates an APT from opportunistic crime. A ransomware affiliate scanning the internet for any unpatched VPN appliance will move on if you are hard to breach; an APT tasked with your organisation will keep trying.
Security vendors give groups different names, so the same actor may appear as APT29, Cozy Bear, or Midnight Blizzard. MITRE ATT&CK tracks them under stable group IDs, which makes cross-referencing easier.
| Group | ATT&CK ID | Attributed to | Notable activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| APT28 (Fancy Bear) | G0007 | Russia, GRU | Long-running credential theft against governments and political organisations |
| APT29 (Cozy Bear) | G0016 | Russia, SVR | SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise, disclosed in December 2020 |
| Lazarus Group | G0032 | North Korea | WannaCry, May 2017, which disrupted parts of the NHS |
In April 2021 the UK government formally attributed the SolarWinds campaign to Russia’s SVR, and in March 2024 it attributed the compromise of the Electoral Commission to a China state-affiliated actor and named the Chinese group APT31 for targeting parliamentarians. Joint advisories co-signed by the NCSC in 2023 and 2024 also described Volt Typhoon, a Chinese group pre-positioning inside critical infrastructure using almost no malware at all.
Models such as the Cyber Kill Chain describe these stages so defenders can place a control at each one.
APTs are designed to avoid alerts, so the clues tend to be subtle: an administrator account logging in at unusual hours or from a new country, PowerShell or WMI used on servers that rarely need it, mailbox forwarding rules nobody created, small but regular outbound connections to unfamiliar hosts, or new OAuth applications granted wide permissions in Microsoft 365. Individually these look like noise; correlated over weeks, they tell a story.
No single product stops an APT. The practical aim is to make each step expensive and to shorten the time between intrusion and detection:
For UK organisations, the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework and its Early Warning service are useful starting points. To find out whether your defences would hold against a patient, intelligence-led attacker, our Red Team services emulate real APT tradecraft against your people, processes, and technology.
No. Governments and defence contractors are obvious targets, but APT groups also pursue law firms, universities, telecoms providers, managed service providers, and manufacturers. Smaller suppliers are often targeted precisely because they offer a quieter route into a larger customer. If you hold valuable intellectual property, sensitive personal data, or privileged access to other organisations, you are a plausible target.
Ransomware groups are financially motivated and want to be noticed eventually, because they need you to pay. APTs usually want to stay hidden for as long as possible to keep collecting intelligence. The line is blurring, though: some state-linked groups, notably in North Korea, also steal money, and criminal groups increasingly use APT-style techniques.
It varies widely. Some intrusions are spotted within days, while others, such as the SolarWinds campaign, ran for many months before discovery. Detection time depends heavily on logging coverage, how well alerts are triaged, and whether anyone is actively hunting. Organisations without a monitored security operation tend to learn about an intrusion from a third party.
Yes. Red team exercises and adversary emulation recreate the tactics of specific groups, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, to see whether your controls detect and contain them. In the UK financial sector, intelligence-led frameworks such as CBEST formalise this approach. The value lies as much in testing detection and response as in finding vulnerabilities.
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