Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A CAA record names the certificate authorities allowed to issue for your domain. Every public CA must check it, which makes it a two-minute control with real value.

What Is a DNS CAA Record?
Any publicly trusted certificate authority can, technically, issue a certificate for any domain name. There are well over a hundred of them in the default trust stores, spread across many jurisdictions, and a single one behaving badly or being compromised undermines everyone. A Certification Authority Authorization record, defined in RFC 8659, lets a domain owner publish a short list of the authorities permitted to issue for that name. Since 8 September 2017 the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements have made checking it mandatory, so unlike many well-intentioned DNS records this one is actually enforced.
A CAA record has a flag, a tag, and a value:
example.co.uk. IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
example.co.uk. IN CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"
example.co.uk. IN CAA 0 issuewild ";"
example.co.uk. IN CAA 0 iodef "mailto:[email protected]"
The issue tag names an authority permitted to issue ordinary certificates. The issuewild tag governs wildcard certificates separately, and a value of ; forbids them entirely, which is a sensible default for most organisations. The iodef tag gives an address where an authority can report a request that violated the policy — a genuinely useful early warning, though not every CA sends them.
The flag byte is the critical-flag. Set to 128 it means an authority that does not understand the tag must refuse to issue. Leave it at 0 unless you have a specific reason.
Before issuing, the authority queries the exact name requested. If there is no CAA record set, it walks up the tree: a request for shop.example.co.uk falls back to example.co.uk, and so on. The first level that has any CAA record wins, and the search stops there. Public suffixes such as co.uk are not consulted, so the climb ends at your registrable domain.
This inheritance has a practical consequence. Publishing a record at the apex covers every subdomain automatically, which is what most organisations want. If one subdomain needs a different authority, publish a complete record set at that subdomain, because a record there replaces the apex policy rather than adding to it. Forgetting that is the usual cause of a failed renewal after a CAA change.
Three further points. The check is performed by the CA at issuance time only; it does not affect browsers or existing certificates. The result is cached according to your DNS time-to-live, so a policy change is not instant. And because the record is fetched over DNS, an attacker who can forge DNS responses can make a CAA record disappear, which is why DNSSEC materially strengthens the control.
Two optional parameters raise the bar considerably, and both are supported by Let’s Encrypt among others.
accounturi restricts issuance to a specific ACME account, so even a request to the right authority from a different account is refused. This defeats an attacker who passes domain validation but is not using your account.validationmethods restricts which challenge types are acceptable, for example dns-01 only. That closes off HTTP validation, which is the method most exposed to BGP hijacking and to a compromised web server.A record using both looks like 0 issue "letsencrypt.org; accounturi=https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/acme/acct/123456; validationmethods=dns-01".
Inventory first. Certificate transparency logs will tell you every authority that has issued for your domains, including the ones a department bought directly, and that list is almost always longer than expected. Include every authority you genuinely use, plus any your cloud provider or CDN uses on your behalf — managed certificates from AWS, Azure, Cloudflare, and similar platforms are issued by authorities you must permit explicitly.
Publish, then watch for failed renewals for a full renewal cycle before tightening. Pair the record with certificate transparency monitoring, because CAA prevents misissuance by compliant authorities while transparency monitoring detects anything that slipped through. Together they cost almost nothing and close a category of attack that transparency logs alone can only report after the fact.
Our Infrastructure and Architecture Review Services include certificate and DNS policy review across all the domains an organisation actually owns.
No. CAA is checked only by certificate authorities at the moment of issuance. Browsers do not look at it, and a certificate already issued remains valid even if you later publish a record forbidding its issuer. The control prevents future misissuance; it does not revoke anything, so pair it with certificate transparency monitoring for detection.
Existing certificates continue to work, because nothing re-checks them. The risk is at renewal: if the authority renewing your certificate is not listed, issuance fails and the certificate eventually expires. Inventory every issuer in use, including those your cloud provider or CDN uses on your behalf, before publishing, and monitor the first renewal cycle closely.
For most organisations, yes. Setting issuewild to a semicolon prevents wildcard issuance entirely. Wildcards spread a single private key across many systems, so one compromised host exposes every name under the domain. If a specific platform genuinely requires one, permit it narrowly rather than opening wildcard issuance across the whole estate.
It helps a great deal but is not required. Without DNSSEC, an attacker who can tamper with DNS responses seen by the certificate authority can hide your CAA record and proceed. With DNSSEC, the authority can verify the record is genuine. CAA on its own still blocks accidental and opportunistic misissuance, which is the common case.
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